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Chinese agricultural cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa
Challenging preconceptions
Jean-Jacques GABAS, Xiaoyang TANG > Through Perspective, CIRAD provides the opportunity to explore new avenues for discussion and action based on research, without presenting an institutional position. This growing presence is generating rumours and preconceptions, which are often disseminated through the media. As a result of insufficient transparency in Chinese policy and a lack of understanding, these rumours and preconceptions are leading some operators in the field of cooperation to mistrust or even disregard Chinese agricultural cooperation. This mistrust primarily concerns long-standing operators involved in cooperation with Africa, especially members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), and African leaders. It hampers cooperation between donors, which has nevertheless become necessary in a context in which budget constraints are increasing and a consensus is emerging between 
China asserting its singularity
Although its cooperation policy is an element of its international geopolitics, and is therefore not disinterested, as in other countries, China is nevertheless asserting its singularity. As an emerging country imposing itself in international affairs, it does not subscribe to certain norms adopted by the DAC countries. It distinguishes itself from North-South cooperation, which it sees as tainted by the colonial legacy, and has made non-interference in the internal affairs of states a key pillar of its foreign policy. It favours South-South cooperation on a basis it describes as win-win. It continues to maintain relations with states shunned by the international community, and refuses relations with any nation that recognises Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Swaziland, São Tomé and Príncipe). Its aid is tied; it does not subscribe to the target of committing 0.7% of its gross national income to official development assistance; and its aid accounting rules differ from those adopted by the DAC countries.
Amounts are still low
China is considered as a major donor for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa.
Although its funding has been increasing steadily, especially since 2008, the amount of its aid remains limited, and is well below that of the OECD countries: around 130 million dollars from 2009 to 2012 (amount estimated from the cost of the agricultural demonstration centres, excluding multilateral aid, especially through the World Food Programme), compared to 3 billion dollars committed by DAC bilateral and multilateral donors to agriculture and rural development for 2012 alone. It should be noted that this comparison remains problematic and gives only an order of magnitude, as the figures are not based on the same definitions or statistical methodologies, and Chinese data is often opaque. This relatively modest contribution is confirmed by the AFD-CIRAD study: of the 100 projects studied, 60% are awarded as grants (and the rest as public or private loans). Moreover, these projects only concern a small number of countries: Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal in West Africa, for 60%; and Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique in Southern Africa, for 40%.
Chinese agricultural aid is nevertheless expected to increase, alongside China's massive intervention in the construction of infrastructure and in the search for mineral and oil resources for its own growth.
Few land acquisitions, production for local markets
China is often accused of acquiring millions of hectares of land in sub-Saharan Africa to ensure its own food security.
According to Land Matrix data, China's public and private land acquisitions represent only 290 000 hectares, 15 times less than the land acquired by the United States, almost 10 times less than the United Arab Emirates and more than 6 times less than the United Kingdom. Chinese land acquisitions are concentrated in just a few countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Mozambique, and Benin. It should be noted that Africa is not a priority continent for China, which has acquired almost twice as much land in South America and in Southeast Asia.
With regard to the accusation of producing to "feed its own population", evidence indicates that Chinese agricultural companies present in Africa produce food crops (vegetables, rice, beans, sugarcane, maize, soy, etc.) for domestic or regional markets. Far from feeding China, the African continent imports from this country These demonstration centres are evidence of the cooperation policy in force, based on publicprivate partnerships, combining grants and commercial activities. For the first three years, the Chinese government awards grants: for the construction of the centre, carried out by Chinese state-owned companies; and for agricultural training and extension provided by Chinese experts. After the first three years, the centres are expected to sell their training services and their products, especially vegetables, on local markets in order to become self-financing. As the creation of these centres is recent, there has not yet been any impact assessment.
The demonstration centres also illustrate a model based on technical-economic aspects, implying that food security is a matter of the availability of agricultural products. Consequently, China takes little account of constraints on demand, grain market failures, the institutional environment or the role of agriculture against a broader development backdrop. Whether in the administrations responsible for cooperation or in research, it gives little attention to or even disregards issues of market instability, insurance, youth employment in a context of rapid population growth in rural areas, or the structural transformation of agricultural economies. True to its principle of non-interference, and also aware of the insufficient number of its technical assistants, it has little involvement in the drafting of national agricultural policies or in the research agendas of national agricultural institutes.
A diversification of operators is slow. It is influenced by China's own experience of development, by the assessment practices of other donors, by negotiations with the beneficiaries of aid (policy makers, farmers' organisations), or by participation in international negotiating bodies on aid effectiveness (the China-DAC Study Group, the Busan forum, etc.).
It is also influenced by experience sharing, as with the visit of Chinese operators to Embrapa (Brazil) to discuss Brazilian agricultural development and what Africa can learn from it.
Finally, it is influenced by the circulation of ideas between national administrations in charge of cooperation, between trilateral cooperation partners, between the world of research and that of higher education, and between civil society representatives, etc.
Ideas and experiences are revealing a certain permeability, indicating that these worlds are not entirely distinct. This permeability should be encouraged in order to eradicate preconceptions on both sides, based on the findings of research. It will then be possible to discuss the cooperation and development paradigms not only of China, but also of the traditional DAC donors. < 1990s, the Chinese government controlled all interventions in the agricultural sector in Africa. But since then, the institutional landscape has become more diversified and complex.
In China, development assistance is managed by three ministries: 
